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For the philosophy of medicine, there ar·e two things of interest a1;>out the stoic account 9f moral 
norms, quite apart from whether the rest of stoic ethical theolY is compelling One is the stoic 
version of naturalism: its account of practical reasoning, its solution to the is/ought problem, 
arrd its contention that norms for creating, sustaining, or restoringhumarr health ar·e tarrtamount 
to moral norms The other is the stoic account of humarr agency: its description of the intimate 
connections between human health, rational agency, arrd moral norms.. There is practical 
gnidarrce to be gained from exploring those connections, whether or not one is ready to follow 
stoic moral theory all the way to its austere end 
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L INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers of medicine may find it useful to explore the resources of stoic! 
ethical theory.. For one thing, stoic norms, like medical ones, are grounded in a 
schematic account of human nature and diversity, with an implicit metaethic 
that is parallel to norm-setting discussions in medicine about what constitutes 
physical health for a given human individual in a given environment Both 
normative enterprises thus grow out of preliminary, abstract descriptions 
of human species-characteristics, but in their normative applications are 
relentlessly particularistic - meant to be modified as needed for the pecu-
liarities of particular cases.. For another thing, stoics argue for an intimate 
connection between health and virtue - one so intimate, in fact, that for stoics, 
effective health care is ipsofacto an element of caring for the recipient's moral 
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development. Even if modem philosophers of medicine are ultimately 
unpersuaded by that very strong thesis, they have a good deal to gain from 
examining the case for it 
II THE STOIC AGENDA 
Stoics think it is no more difficult to derive norms about moral conduct from 
facts about human physiology and psychology (human nature) than it is to derive 
norms about health from those facts .. It is true that humans differ from each other 
considerably in their anatomy, physiology, and psychology. Yet there is general 
agreement that we can derive philosophically defensible and determinative 
medical norms from general facts about human nature, amended (when applied 
to cases) by more specific information about the individuals and environments 
involved.. We routinely derive, test and refine norms about nutritional 
requirements, for instance, or lethal environments, or satisfactory blood gases, 
or pathological mental states in this way. Even if it is true, as philosophers have 
recently argued, that it is more or less futile to try to define medically significant 
concepts of health, disease, and normality for human beings in the abstract,2 
none of those authors supposes that the whole enterprise of medicine is futile, as 
it would be if it were equally difficult to define medically significant norms of 
health, disease, and normality in the full particularity of concrete cases .. Such 
particularistic medical norms collectively define the forms and conditions oflife 
in which we believe human beings can be healthy, and no one is surprised to find 
the arguments for them to be thoroughly naturalistic. 
Suppose we say that moral norms, by contrast, define the forms of life in 
which we believe human beings can be virtuous.. There is, of course, 
remarkable diversity in the patterns of human conduct and character - in the 
complex sets of intentions, beliefs, values, plans, hopes, expectations and 
patterns of conduct that defirie various ways of life and conceptions of a life 
worth living .. But for stoics, moral norms define, first and foremost, the forms 
of life in which human beings can be psychologically healthy, because stoics 
hold that human moral excellence (virtue) just is the pinnacle of healthy 
psychological development with respect to a special feature of paradigmat-
ically human life: active rational agency. So when we get medical norms for 
human psychological health trom facts about the world, we also get stoic 
moral norms .. Physical health enters the picture insofar as it is important for 
psychological health, and hence, for virtue .. 
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For the philosophy of medicine, there are two things here of general 
philosophical interest, quite apart from whether the rest of stoic ethical theory 
is compelling .. One is the stoic version of naturalism: its account of practical 
reasoning, its solution to the is/ought problem, and its contention that norms 
for creating, sustaining, or restoring human health are tantamount to moral 
norms .. The other is the stoic account of human agency: its description of the 
intimate connections between human health, rational agency, and moral 
norms There is practical guidance to be gained from exploring those 
connections, whether or not one is ready to follow stoic moral theory all the 
way to its austere end .. 
In what follows, I shall simply describe - mostly without much supporting 
argument - the relevant stoic views, leaving to my nonstoic readers the 
straightforward task of extracting items of philosophical interest 
IlL METAETHICS: IS, OUGHT, MORAL NORMS, 
AND ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION 
The Moml Point of View. Stoics hold that nothing distinguishes moral 
reasoning and the moral point of view from other forms of practical reasoning 
except inclusiveness, and hence finality Moral reasoning is simply practical 
reasoning all-things-considered .. It is reasoning about what we ought to do 
and be, but not from a special-purpose point of view such as prudence, 
benevolence, legality, or efficiency - or health care .. Its question is not "In 
terms of prudence (or benevolence, or law, or efficiency), what ought I to do?" 
but rather "Everything considered, what is it, finally, that I ought to do or be?" 
Of all practical questions, this is the only one whose answer can have the 
logical (as opposed to merely psychological) finality or ovetridingness people 
expect moral judgments to have3 
From Is to Ought. Stoics hold that, just as there is no logical sleight of hand 
in the derivation of special-purpose norms, there is nothing mysterious about 
the derivation of moral norms In both cases we begin with an aim or a goal 
that is "given" - already in operation in a game we are playing, ajob we are 
doing, or more fundamentally, in our psychology. Such fundamental ends may 
be either part of our genetic endowments, or our largely subconscious 
psychological development, or our deliberate choices, but they already 
contain implicit imperatives - norms for our behavior ("Be careful!", "Be 
kind!", "Get satisfaction!,,)4 
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Practical reasoning then does three things: (a) It finds any available means to 
the given end5 (b) Then for any means found, it asks whether there is a decisive 
reason not to take it, both as compared to taking other means to the same end and 
as compared to taking none of them. It assesses these matters both in the light of 
conflicting ends we may have (our internal economy of competing purposes), 
and in the light of relevant strategic considerations (how other people will react 
if we take this step toward our goals) .. And then (c) bom the remaining available 
alternatives, if any, it selects one .. This is an everyday process .. 
Think of playing chess .. The aim is to win - to force the other player into 
checkmate .. That fundamental imperative is built into the enterprise .. But for 
most moves there are many alternatives to assess, both tactically and 
strategically. And if the game is one of many in a championship match, or is 
embedded in a controlling social project such as entertaining a guest, it may be 
wise to forfeit or tie, thus violating the fundamental imperative of the game 
considered by itself. The same sort of reasoning that regularly assesses and 
implements norms within the game and in aid of its fundamental imperative 
also assesses play in a wider context 
Moral reasoning, for stoics, is simply the most wide-ranging form of 
practical reasoning we can manage - one in which we try to consider every 
possible means, every conceivable competing purpose we might have, every 
possible ramification of and reaction to what we might do or strive to be .. It is 
practical reasoning all-things-considered6 
Ultimate Justification. Notice that moral reasoning of this all-encompassing 
sort resolves the problem of ultimate justification by shifting the burden of proof 
to the skeptic: If the game is already underway, then when we have established 
by thoroughgoing reflection (on the fly, as it were), that there is no decisive 
reason to stop or alter our activity, then for practical purposes we have gotten a 
thoroughgoing justification of it 7 Skeptics who continue to ask for reasons for 
endorsing what we are doing will put themselves in the comical position of 
suggesting hesitation or change when a thorough search has uncovered no 
decisive basis for it - the purest form of argumentum ad ignortantiam .. 
IV. NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY: HUMAN NATURE, 
HEALTH AND VIRTUE 
Stoics operate with the following schematic account of human moral 
development8 It is meant to describe a sequence of events that unfolds 
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naturally in the course of every human life, given minimal conditions for 
physical and psychological health.. Its end point is virtue, understood as 
excellence in active rational agency, and such excellence is understood as a 
similarly natural development, first from mere health into fitness, and then 
from fitness into virtuoso agency9 "Natural development" here means 
nothing more than unimpeded development: a trajectory set in motion and 
sustained by the healthy human constitution itself in a very wide range of 
circumstances., Medical norms related to agency - that is, the norms that 
define the necessary and sufficient conditions for creating, sustaining or 
restoring healthy agency - are thus identical to the norms that define the 
conditions for creating, sustaining or restoring stoic moral development and 
virtue, 
This stoic account of moral development begins with a thesis about the 
behavior of infants in the cradle - a thesis that contrasts sharply with other 
ancient (and some modern) accounts of the same matters" Epicureans, for 
example, along with some modern behaviorists, insist that the controlling 
motivation of infants is to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and that this is 
evidence for thinking that pleasure is the ultimate or final human good" Such 
an inference is not plausible, however, unless we also hold that human 
development does not radically transform or eliminate infant behavior but is 
rather a matter of growth and maturation - of increasing the size, subtlety, 
complexity, and power of what we start with as infants, along the trajectory 
suggested by our earliest behavior.. But the Stoics r{)jected both the pleasure/ 
pain account of infant motivation and the growth/maturation account of 
development 
On the Stoic account, infants in the cradle are motivated primarily by their 
attachment to and "affection" for themselves - attachment and affection that 
show themselves in behavior aimed at self~preservation and the satisfaction of 
"impulses" of many sorts" The Stoics insisted on the point (as a matter of 
observational knowledge) that infants often subordinate pleasure-seeking to 
other pursuits, such as efforts to move, to explore their environment, to 
observe, respond, mimic and learnlO They believed that the obvious 
explanation for such behavior was that infants had a primitive consciousness 
of themselves and their interests, and a built-in affection (appropriate 
disposition) for preserving themselves and satisfying all of their interests" 
Moreover, the Stoics held that psychological development was self~ 
transformative in a predictable way, In their view, mature human beings 
were fundamentally different creatures from immature onesll And they held, 
/ 
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against the Aristotelians, that habituation was not the fi.mdamental mechanism 
of character formation .. Rather, they thought that the fundamental mechanism 
was oikeiosis .. 12 
Here is how the mechanism works, according to the Stoics .. Early in infancy 
children's natural affection for themselves is extended to external physical 
objects and states that are (or appear to them to be) instrumental to satisfying 
their primal impulses .. Infants acquire an affection for the people who care for 
them effectively, and for comforting or pleasurable or useful o~jects .. Then a 
fundamental transformation occurs .. Children soon begin to "appropriate" 
these useful objects psychologically - making the external things· "their 
own," as it were, in a way that makes the affection for them like the natural 
affection the infants have for themselves. This makes the children disposed to 
preserve (and act for) the external things in the same way they are disposed to 
preserve and act for themselves .. Thus the initial, conditional affection for the 
things as means to ends is converted, through oikeiosis, into an affection that is 
quite independent of perceptions of a thing's instrumental worth. Even if the 
caretaker has become umeliable, or the useful object is broken, once we have 
"appropriated" such things, we have affection for them in themselves, for 
their own sakes .. They have intrinsic value for us .. 
It is instructive to think about what sorts of health concerns we might have 
about this psychological appropriation or internalization of objects .. We are 
rightly concerned about the extent to which children (and adults) might 
become over-attached to objects - so attached that they are unable to cope 
with separation or loss; so attached that separation or loss is a serious 
impediment to health, requiring intervention to set things back on course .. We 
are likely to recommend, as a matter of mental health, that those who take care 
of children take steps to moderate their o~ject-attachments, and to teach them 
to cope with loss .. This is precisely the concern stoics have about the way 
psychological attachments can compromise moral development, and the stoic 
remedy is the same: make sure that the attachments are compatible with the 
ability to cope with 10SS .. 13 
The next major step in (stoic) development occurs when children acquire 
language and begin to represent states of affairs and causal connections to 
themselves, and to generalize, hypothesize, and make rules about how to get 
what they want The same two-step process occurs here as well, with dramatic 
consequences.. Children first develop an affection for the beliefs and 
inferences that are instrumental (the ones that work; the "correct" ones), 
just because those are the ones that work A similar affection arises for 
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rule-following behavior that is successfuL Then, through oikeiosis, children at 
a surprisingly early age begin to appropriate their useful beliefs, general-
izations, rules, and expectations - and thus to convert affection for the 
instrumental worth of such things into affection for the things in themselves .. 
Children thus come to have an affection for true belief~ correct conduct, and 
rule-following for its own sake, quite independently of valuing it for its 
usefulness.. This is, moreover, a recursive process, Beliefs are repeatedly 
modified in the light of new experience., Inconsistencies are repeatedly dealt 
with in order to make it possible for conduct to conform to all the beliefs one 
has., Children thus come to value coherence and consistency as well as 
correctness - first for instrumental reasons, and then through oikeiosis, for rts 
own sake,. 
The health concerns we commonly have about this step in the process are 
also parallel to stoic ones, along three normative dimensions .. One is a strong 
prohibition on any interference with the acquisition of language and the 
development of the cognitive abilities inherent in fluent language use - not 
only with respect to the memory, imagination of the future, and self awareness 
that arise or develop with language, but also with respect to the basic patterns 
of thought (relevance, consistency, inference, explanation, prediction) 
developed with it The inability to acquire these things, given a reasonably 
hospitable environment, is conclusive medical evidence of ill-health or a 
deficiency that calls for corrective treatment Deliberate infliction of such 
inability on a child would be prohibited, just in terms of what counts as health 
care, in almost any imaginable environment These are medical norms, based 
on notions of physical and psychological health, but they are also stoic moral 
norms, based on the definition of virtue as the perfection of the activity of 
rational agency. 
A second normative parallel is a requirement that we actively enable or 
assist children in the acquisition of language and the cognitive abilities arising 
flom it This too is common ly thought of as part of caring for the health of the 
child, and in stoic ethical theory, it is caring for the child's moral development 
as welL 
And finally, there is a parallel between health care and stoic moral norms 
with respect to the dangers involved in this step .. It is dangerous to our health 
(and to stoic moral development) to become "rule-bound" - too attached to 
particular routines, rules, or patterns of thought, or to particular memories or 
expectations., When such attachments interfere with major life activities, our 
health is compromised .. 
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The penultimate step in the stoic developmental story comes with the 
realization of the instrumental value of practical intelligence itself, and the 
attendant affection that we eventually develop for the general ability to do 
things correctly - in the right way, for the right reasons .. This is quite distinct 
from the affection for getting the desired outcome .. The novice archer wants to 
hit the target, certainly, but soon comes to appreciate that the most reliable 
way to get that result is by making the shot correctly.. And this lesson, once 
learned in a few contexts, is generalized into an affection for practical abilities 
of all sorts.. Affection for the usefulness of these things is then also 
transformed, through oikeiosis, into an affection for them that is quite 
independent of their utility We come to value, for its own sake, the ability to 
do things in the right way for the right reasons .. Or so stoics suppose .. 
The final step, stoics suppose, comes from the persistent commitment to 
cultivate practical intelligence, once we love it both for its utility and for its 
own sake .. This is the step that puts people decisively on the path to stoic 
virtue, though like paths to other forms of virtuosity, few take it To take it is to 
see that hitting the target (getting many of the things we want) is not ultimately 
within our control, and not within our control at all except through the correct 
exercise of our practical intelligence .. Getting that much right (perfecting our 
ability to do the right thing in the right way) then becomes our paramount 
concern in every context At first, of course, we want this merely as a means to 
our other ends .. But it is quite natural to appropriate it as well, and through 
oikeiosis, come to have a paramount concern for perfecting the exercise of our 
practical intelligence for its own sake .. 
For these two last steps of the stoic account of moral development, it is 
probably not possible to make the case for a close parallel between medical 
norms and stoic moral ones .. That is because these steps take matters beyond 
health into the areas of fitness and virtuosity. Medicine sometimes ventures 
into this terrain - in sports medicine, performance-enhancing tr·eatrnents, 
cosmetic procedures, and so forth - but there is persistent dissent about its 
connection to health, and hence its appropriateness as a medical concern.. In 
terms of the norms implicit in health care itself, this sort of medicine seems at 
most merely permissible .. By contrast, since stoics see virtue as a level of 
rational agency far beyond mere health, their moral norms address this 
accordingly. Deliberately impeding the development from health to fitness, 
and from fitness to virtuoso agency is prohibited; supporting it is required .. But 
perfectionistic aims unrelated to virtue (the whitest possible teeth, for 
example) are decisively matters of indifference for stoics .. 
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This discussion has been quite abstract, and it may be usefUl at this point to 
bring it to bear on some concrete issues in medical ethics - especially on some 
much discussed issues, in order to see more clearly whether there is anything 
new here .. These illustrations will necessarily be sketchy, and to simplify the 
expository problems, I will confine them to topics that have been thoroughly 
worked over by utilitarians, Kantians, and modem Aristotelians .. I will begin 
with some general remarks about applying stoic principles to cases, and then 
move on to consider questions about suicide, assisted suicide, euthanasia, and 
quality of life. 
A. Moving from Theory to Practice, in General 
Particularism .. Stoics are particularists about moral decision-making .. That 
means two things.. First, stoics expect to be able to construct concrete 
normative advice about many of the details of how a given person should act in 
a given situation. Stoic ethical theory is aimed quite directly at actual practice, 
not merely at constructing sets of general principles .. But second, stoics do not 
expect to be able to deal with moral cases a priori .. The details will always 
depend on who the people involved are (in terms of their character, ability, 
knowledge, limitations) and what their physical and social circumstances are .. 
This does not mean that stoics are moral relativists .. Surgeons, after all, are not 
considered epistemological relativists when they operate in terms of the 
nonstandard anatomy they see before them on the table rather than in terms of 
the normative expectations they acquired in the course of their medical 
education and practice .. In a similar way, stoics are particularists without being 
relativists in the moral judgments they make about particular cases .. 
Internalism about conceptions of virtue and a good life.. The stoic 
conception of virtue and human good is constructed from considerations 
"internal" to the constitution or nature of physically and psychologically 
healthy human beings .. That conception of virtue is normative for such human 
beings only. Sharks have their own form of excellence, and their own form of a 
good life .. It would not be intrinsically good for sharks (as opposed to good for 
other fish) if we tried to teach them to read, and to respect the rights of 
bluefish. Similarly, humans with significantly abnormal constitutions - in 
particular, abnormal psychological constitutions - will have significantly 
abnormal forms of virtue and conceptions of the good internal to their 
230 LAWRENCE C BECKER 
constitutions .. Only if such abnormalities are temporary or reversible would it 
be intrinsically good for them (as opposed to good for other humans) if we 
tried to press a stoic conception of virtue on them. _ 
Nonpaternalism and appreciation of difference .. It does not follow from the 
fact that stoics endorse the perfection of active, rational agency for normally 
developing human beings that they are thereby committed to an uncaring 
attitude toward human beings who have permanently ceased to be rational 
agents, or who are prevented, by disability, from becoming rational agents. 
Moreover, stoic theory does not entail a dismissive or uncaring attitude toward 
nonhuman animals, as has sometimes been alleged.. On the contrary, on the 
stoic account, when healthy human beings develop through oikeiosis an 
interest in the well-being of others for their own sakes,that interest is an 
interest in their having whatever counts as a good life for them, no matter how 
different that might be from what counts as a good life for us .. 
Appreciation of difference must be cosmopolitan, but not self-defeating.. 
Oikeiosis transforms our thinking about others, and about their various 
properties or characteristics .. We begin with an appreciation of how others, or 
some of their characteristics, ar·e instrumental goods for ourselves and move to 
an appreciation of how those others or characteristics are good in themselves .. 
Stoic theory is cosmopolitan in insisting that it is wrong to confine this process 
to locals, or to objects of the most basic and immediate instrumental value to 
us .. We live in the whole world as well as in a particular part of it; we live 
lifetimes as well as in the moment; we have elaborate intellectual, aesthetic, 
social, and psychological needs .. It is just an error to imagine that the only 
things, animals, and people that are instrumentally good for us are things, 
animals, and people in our immediate vicinity, or that are in our most basic and 
immediate interests .. 
Moreover, it is an error to confuse token with type, or part with whole .. 
Oikeiosis operates on parts and types as well as whole individuals, and stoic 
moral psychology is thoroughly conventional in accounting for how we can 
come to "love the man and hate the sin;" or to believe that a certain sort of 
person typically has characteristic X, even if all the ones we know personally 
lack X. These part-whole &stinctions can lead us into errors - invidious 
prejudices, denial, blind loyalty and so forth .. But once we prevent or correct 
those errors, sound distinctions and inferences widen the bounds of our purely 
instrumental appreciation of others, and through oikeiosis we develop a 
similarly widened appreciation of the intrinsic worth of a worldwide range of 
other objects, animals and people .. Notice, however, that this process does not 
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get off the ground directly in cases where something (say, the polio vilUs) has 
no known instrumental value for us, basic or otherwise, in part or in whole, as 
a type or a token .. Nor does it get off the ground directly in our confrontation 
with some human beings (say, relentless killers) whose only relation to us 
threatens our survival, 01 ability to thrive .. Indirectly, oikeiosis can give us a 
limited appreciation of intrinsic WOlth in such cases.. We can acquire an 
appreciation of the intrinsic worth of some of the properties of beneficial 
viruses, for example, and then extrapolate that admiration to all viruses with 
similar properties .. We can extrapolate our appreciation of various aspects of 
beneficial human agency to similar aspects of the agency of relentless killers .. 
But on a stoic account, the recommended forms of such appreciation of 
intrinsic worth will be only those developed through oikeiosis, and action 
based on that appreciation must not be self~defeating.. It must be aimed at 
creating a maintaining arrangements in which threatening things or people can 
flourish on their own terms without defeating our own pursuit of virtue .. 
B. Suicide and Assisted Suicide 
The ancient Stoics notoriously endorsed suicide, and it seems fair to say that 
they would have been willing to endorse some forms of assisted suicide, had 
they directly addressed the question .. After all, if death by his own hand was 
the right thing for Cato, given his circumstances, then it is hard to see why it 
would necessarily have been wrong for someone to hand him a sword at his 
request, 01 sharpen it for him while he finished his other business .. The stories 
ancient philosophers tell of stoic suicides usually do involve such assistance, 
and it is not questioned But we should remember that stoic constraints on 
suicide itself are stringent, and the nature of the justification offered for it 
guarantees that assisted suicide will rarely be justified .. This fits rather well 
with existing norms for medical practice .. To see why this is so, consider: 
Stoics endorse suicide if and only if it is the last best option for the expression 
of rational agency in a particular life (as it might have been for Seneca, given 
his character and circumstances, after Nero sentenced him to death).. This 
endorsement is derived from the stoic doctrine that it is our activity as rational 
agents. that is the only thing of ultimate value as an end .. But it also follows 
from this doctrine that suicide as a way of merely escaping pain, or 
unpleasantness, or depression, or the burdens of rational agency itself would 
not be justified .. For stoics, the quality of one's life as a healthy, normally 
formed human being is not measured, ultimately, by the hedonic quality of 
one's experience .. What counts is one's ability to understand the world and to 
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act effectively in it That, and not hedonic tone, is the source of happiness, and 
stoics famously hold that one can be "happy" (flourish, have a good life) in 
that sense in prison, or in slavery, or (as Marcus Aurelius wryly observes) in a 
palace .. Sages, it is said, can even be happy on the rack, though they will groan 
in pain as much as anyone else. 
If modem medical norms were to follow stoic ones on the question of 
suicide and end-of~life discussions, as they now often proceed in political and 
ethical discussions, they would have to be reframed in a fundamental way. 
(Oddly, it is not clear that existing medical practice would be as significantly 
changed .. Perhaps there is a good deal of stoic theory already embedded in 
medical norms.) Stoics do not frame these issues primarily in terms of 
imminent death and the bad hedonic quality of the dying person's experience .. 
Those are subsidiary matters, and legal statutes or professional codes of ethics 
that try to restrict "death with dignity" decisions to those circumstances 
would be repudiated by stoics .. Moreover, stoics do not frame these issues in 
terms of a priori absolutes about the infinite moral worth of every human life, 
whether characterized by rational agency or not, and would repudiate any 
absolute requirement to preserve human life in a persistent vegetative state 
Similarly, palliative treatments that permanently compromise the dying 
person's rational agency would be repudiated .. 
The primary issue for stoic theory and stoic medical practice is whether the 
dying person can be sustained as an active, effective rational agent The 
answer to that question will always be person-specific, and will depend as 
much on that person's psychological set up and social circumstances as on his 
or her medical condition. It may be that sages can be happy in virtually any 
circumstances, but we are not all sages, and stoic ethical theory instructs us to 
deal with people as we find them, not as we wish they were .. Some people find 
life as a quadriplegic unbearable precisely because they can no longer be 
active rational agents in any way they recognize as worthwhile, no matter how 
vividly we can imagine such a life for them, and no matter how persistently we 
try to show them how to live that life .. Satisfying ourselves that they are 
medically stable, well cared for, and provided with opportunities to make 
active new lives for themselves may well end our medical obligations to them, 
but it will notjustify (on a stoic account) requiring them to remain alive under 
those conditions, or ignoring their advance medical directives .. 
Neither does it justify assisted suicide, however.. Of course it is true that 
many of the things we do in our daily lives require the active cooperation and 
participation of other people .. This could also be the case for suicide, and there 
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is nothing in stoic ethical theOlY that requires us to withhold our ordinary 
cooperativeness and crue from people who rue (justifiably) making prep-
ruations to end their lives .. But the same stoic doctrine that endorses suicide 
when it is the last best thing we can do as rational agents would refuse to 
endorse any assisted suicide in which the assistance is designed to replace a 
capable, would-be suicide's own agency with another's, or to compensate for 
the would be suicide's ferus or lack of resolve .. That rules out the Dr. 
Kevorkian cases, and perhaps most others in which people call for assistance 
from medical proiessionals .. 14 
In general, however, it seems to me that the most illuminating thing about a 
stoic approach to these questions is the way in which it directs our attention 
away from thinking about life as a vessel for expe!ience - one that is good 
only to the degree that it is filled with experience that is, on balance, pleasant 
rather than painful 15 Likewise, it directs our attention away from the thought 
that the only tolerable forms of life rue ones in which we can hang on to some 
minimum of what we already have, or in which we can preserve some 
previously constructed identity. Rather, stoic moral nOlms direct our attention 
to the possibilities for making and remaking good lives for ourselves as active, 
rational agents .. Norms for medical practice (in end-of-life situations) that rue 
in line with those stoic ideas rue intellectually refreshing to consider. 
c. Euthanasia and Lives Worth Liviug 
For aspiring stoic sages, the only life wOlth living is a life of stoic virtue, and 
the only good death is a death consistent with such virtue .. But as I have 
remruked previously, in stoic theory that is a judgment only about the lives of 
people with a certain type of constitution or nature - namely, the generic 
constitution of a mature and healthy human being. Human infants have a 
significantly different constitution, in which rational agency is at most a 
prospect, and the same is true to lesser degrees for children up to the age of 
reason (roughly 14, according to the ancient Stoics), and for formerly healthy 
adults whose rational agency has been damaged by disease or injury. The 
prospects for their development or return to rational agency define, in lruge 
measure, the nature and extent of moral nOlms for paternalistic mtervention -
both medical and routine .. In standrud cases, we take the steps needed to help 
along the nOlmal course of development or rehabilitation, and these steps 
sometimes involve considerable discomfOlt or pain for the patient 
But suppose the child (or damaged adult) lacks the potential for rational 
agency? I suggest that stoic theory then requires us to reconsider what counts 
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as a good life for that particular human being, and to make decisions about 
interventions based on our appreciation of the intrinsic worth of that sort of 
life,for that human being, and not merely for us .. This immediately rules out 
any form of euthanasia based merdy on the patient's lack of capacity for 
rational agency. Rather, the relevant question will be whether the patient has 
the prospect (given social circumstances), for a life that is worthwhile in terms 
intrinsic to the patient's actual constitution. If the patient is only capable of a 
primitive form of awareness (not self~awareness), and thus is only a vessel for 
limited forms of sense experience, the only thing that will count as a good life 
for that patient is a favorable balance of pleasure over pain. Consider three 
possibilities for such cases .. 
(1) Medically, it may be that no such favorable balance can be sustained, 
because it may be that sustaining the life without a preponderance of pain 
would mean sustaining it without consciousness .. In such cases, euthanasia 
is surely an option stoics would immediately consider.. It seems 
pointlessly cruel, other things equal, to inflict or prolong such pain, and 
it is hard to see how mere human life, without consciousness, could be 
considered intrinsically good for the bearer of that life .. 16 But presumably 
stoics would also take seriously the standard range of policy arguments 
defending the view that there are other things at stake in these cases as 
well - such as the difficulty in designing social institutions that will 
prevent vicious slippery slopes, and the difficulty posed for the moral 
psychology of people who euthanize other human beings.. Here stoic 
theory probably has little to add to existing discussions .. 
(2) Medically, it might be that a favorable balance of pleasure over pain can 
be sustained for these patients, but that social circumstances will 
inevitably undermine such medical efforts .. One can imagine extremities 
of war or poverty or social organization that reduce these patients' 
prospects for a good life to zero .. Euthanasia would have to be as seriously 
considered here as it is in the cases of medical impossibility 
(3) Medically and socially, it might be possible to sustain a good quality of 
life for these patients, but it might also be very costly, thus significantly 
reducing resources and opportunities for healthy human agents .. Here stoic 
ethical theory would give a typically austere response. Stoics would begin 
with the point that for healthy, mature human agents, the only thing of 
ultimate moral significance is virtue - the perfection of active rational 
agency. All other things, including money, fame, social standing, 
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influence, and worldly achievement ate ultimately matters of "indiffer-
ence" - some of them preferable to others, to be sure, but none of them 
compatable in impOltance to virtue .. So for stoics, the expense, difficulty 
or inconvenience of eating fOl these patients is beside the point if eating 
for them is required by virtue, pr at least is consistent with it If so, then 
the only further issue is whether this enterprise would be self~defeating -
ultimately compromising one's pursuit of virtue, and through it, a good 
life .. But if, as stoics believe, a good (stoic) life is possible in slavery, or in 
poverty, or in a palace, then the circumstances in which cating for another 
will genuinely compromise one's good life in stoic terms ate extreme 
ones.. On this ~uestion, stoic ethical theOlY diverges shatplyrrom 
utilitatian analysis, for exatnple. 
VL WHY SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS OF MEDICINE 
BOTHER WITH STOICISM? 
Stoics have often been dismissed as eccentric, even as fanatic, in their 
insistence that virtue is the only good, that it is an all or nothing affair rather 
than a matter of degree, and that the virtuous person - the sage - is undisturbed 
by passions or attachments .. That dismissive reaction is unfounded, I believe .. 
But in any case those issues ate irrelevant here, since the elements of stoic 
ethics assembled above ate not the eccentric ones .. The metaethical elements 
ate congruent with the most sophisticated forms of naturalism in the 
philosophical repertoire; the valorization of rational agency (as at least one 
fundatnental good) is common currency in ethical theory; a close connection 
between human psychological health and virtue is a common assumption of 
ancient (Westem) ethical theories, and has been central to theories of moral 
responsibility ever since .. So at that very general level there is not even much 
novelty here, let alone eccentricity 
Attention to stoic metaethics, and to the close patallels between the norms 
of medicine and stoic moral norms ate nonetheless instructive .. This is so, I 
believe, because it makes a plausible case for thinking that stoic moral theory-
and possibly most other ethical theories- ate enlatgements or extensions of 
the norms implicit in health cate, and not something sepatate from such 
norms.. Medical norms ate at the center of moral ones, as it were, 
simultaneously anchOling them, and being ratified by their reflective 
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endOlsement, all-things-considered .. And if that is the case, it should be 
productive, both for medical ethics and for ethics per se, to make sure that the 
two realms achieve a stable, thorough theoretical integration - or failing that, 
at least consistency within reflective equilibrium. 
Stoic ethical theOIY provides a useful platform for pursuing that theoretical 
integration .. Stoicism is not a mere historical curiosity. Its influence on Westem 
philosophy has been continuous and significant for over two thousand years .. Its 
ethical theory, once disentangled from its theological metaphysics, has a striking 
and persuasive connection to modem science, and remains philosophically 
formidable .. In sum, stoicism provides a clear; coherent, and refreshing alter-
native to the standard inventOIY of contemporary ethical theories .. 
NOTES 
1. I distinguish the ancient Stoics flOm their contemporary descendants by using a lowercase 
's' for the latter. The outline of what I take to be a philosophically defensible contemporary 
version of stoic ethical theory can be found in my book A New Stoicism (1998). This paper 
is part of a continuing investigation of stoic ethics, other pieces of which will simply be 
referenced rather than summarized in this paper .. 
2 For some of the relevant discussion see Toon (1981); Vacha (1985); Brown (1985); 
Merskey (1986); and Sade (1995). 
3.. For fuller accounts ofthese points in terms of ethical theory generally, see my "The finality 
of moral judgments" (1973) and Chapters 1 and 2 of Reciprocity (1986).. 
4. Contemporary stoics are divided about whether tojettison the ancient Stoic conception of a 
cosmic telos - the notion that the universe itself is a rational being within whose grand 
purposes humans have assigned roles. This controversy, while it makes a big difference in 
other matters, does not make a difference in this one 
5. Legend has it that GE Moore was once asked if he thought the ends justified the means, 
and that he replied, "What else could?" If the end E is a given, and M is a means to E, then 
E is by definition a reason for doing M, though not necessarily a conclusive one. (M may be 
prohibited; there may be a quicker, cheaper, more reliable way to get to E; etc.). 
6 This was the standard view of moral reasoning in Classical Greek and Hellenistic ethics .. 
See Julia Annas: "My station and its duties: ancient ethics and the social embeddedness of 
virtue," December 2000 symposium on the Legacy of Greek Ethics at the Eastern Division 
meeting of the APA I am told, but have not verified, that it is also characteristic of some 
ancient Asian traditions, notably Confucian and Buddhist ones It is often obscured or 
incautiously abandoned in divine command and supreme principle moralities But that 
raises notorious theoretical difficulties See Baier (1958); Foot (1972); etc .. 
7. This point is developed at length in Becker (1973) 
8 The expository parts of this section, though not the interwoven observations on health 
concerns and medical norms, closely follow the ones I give in "Stoic Children", and in A 
New Stoicism. But of course the expository parts ar·e not meant to be novel. They are meant 
, 
, 
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to conform to the ancient texts, especially Cicero, De Flnibus Book ill, and the best modern 
scholarship on the ancient sources 
9 For a much more detailed account of the process, see A New Stoicism, Chapter 6, and for 
evidence from contemporary psychology to support the account, see the "Commentary" to 
Chapter 6. 
10 Cicero, De Finibus ill . .v 
11 (3) "Each period of life has its own constitution, one for the baby, and another for the boy, 
another for the youth, and another for the old man .. They are all related appropriately to that 
constitution in which they exist" (Seneca, Letters 121 15) 
12 The term oikeiosis is hard to put into English It has sometimes been translated as 
familiarization, because it has the same root as house or family. But it is probably better 
translated as attachment, incorporation, or appropriation I will follow Long and Sedley 
(1987) in using the English term appropriation for it . 
13 Stoics are not theoretically committed to anything stronger than this Though some early 
Stoics apparently insisted that in the sage, such attachment to externals, and indeed the 
passions generally, would be completely rooted out, such insistence can only be supported 
if it is necessary for excellence in agency. We have good reasons, however, for agreeing 
with other stoics that the extirpation of attachments and passions is neither psychologically 
possible in healthy humans, nor necessary for virtue .. For the debate, see Inwood (1985, 
chap. 5); Striker (1991, pp .. 62-73); as well as Becker (1998, chap 6, and Commentary to 
that chapter).. 
14 In June of 1993, at the Third International Post-Polio Conference organized by GINI, a 
German judge challenged a panel of physicians and philosophers to describe a case in 
which it was impossible for a rational person, unimpeded by others, to bring about his own 
death in and at a reasonable time, without direct assistance from others beyond their 
provision of standard, life-sustaining care. It was a surprisingly difficult challenge to meet 
Most of the supposed impossibilities hinged on the agent's fears or lack of resolve - things 
that stoics would regard as evidence that the person was unable to meet the conditions for 
rational suicide .. A quadriplegic on a ventilator, for example, supplied with a motorized 
wheelchair in the normal comse of rehabilitation, could plan and carry out many forms of 
suicide. 
15 John Rawls has an illuminating discussion of the concept of persons as "containers" for 
experience versus that of "autonomous persons who have certain fundamental interests " 
in his 1975 Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical 
Association (1999, pp .. 287-300).. 
16 Any living being, animal or vegetable, can flourish or not, in ways appropriate to its 
constitution. But presumably the presence of some sort of subjective experience is 
necessary to license eudaimonistic concerns about good lives, and that includes the lives 
of humans reduced to a permanent vegetative state .. 
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